trap into which he had blundered. He talked of reactivating the Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Commission, an institution held in great contempt in Israel. He proposed to open discussions-not with Israel, whose existence he does not recognize, but with the world powers-concerning the whole Palestinian problem. He had already told the Americans he was prepared to let all ships, even those carrying oil, pass through the Straits to Elat, as long as none carried the Israeli flag.

In Cairo, these may have looked like far-reaching efforts to relieve the crisis, going as far as they could without looking like a retreat. In Jerusalem they did not arouse the slightest notice. They all seemed irrelevant, compared with one remark Nasser had made rather casually, unaware that he had dropped a bombshell; to Arab ears, after all, it was quite routine, even moderate. Nasser said in his press conference that if Israel attacked either Syria or Egypt, this would lead to a war in which the aim of the Arabs would be the final destruction of the State of Israel. In the atmosphere prevailing by this time, after hundreds of similar and more extreme threats from Radio Cairo, it is no wonder that the first part of the phrase was overlooked, or that it seemed an irrelevant decoration. What came through was a direct threat to destroy the State of Israel, the annihilation of every single man, woman and child.

Two days later, while Israel was still busy reshuffling its government, Nasser made his final miscalculation. Looking for the best way to avoid an Israeli attack, he had King Hussein of Jordan come to Cairo. This was meant to say to the Israelis that if war started, it would be waged all along Israel's extensive and indefensible frontiers. The effect was electrifying. If there was any hesitation left in Israel, it disappeared immediately. The Egyptian-Jordanian military pact raised a spectre dreaded by every Israeli: the possibility of a big Arab army, including Egyptians and Iraqis, attacking not from the relatively distant

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