Yet it would be unjust to disclaim the very real part which Dayan played in this dramatic event.
He had nothing to do with preparing the army for the war. For ten years he had been outside the army. A new team, composed of the junior officers of the 1948 war, had produced an efficient, professional, well-trained army, equipped with the instruments needed for the tactics they had decided to employ in case of war. The Israeli Army believes in improvisation, a system well-suited to the Israeli character. It, therefore, has no great master plan, but rather a large number of limited contingency plans, which can be arbitrarily combined in case of need. The actual team which conducted the war, presided over by General Rabin, was an outstanding group of professionals, most of them quite unassuming, not one of them indispensable.
At the beginning of the crisis, when war already seemed probable, Dayan asked to be allowed to visit the command posts on the southern front and study their plans. His request was granted by Eshkol. Thus Dayan was already well acquainted with all command decisions of the planning stage. Upon assuming the post of Minister of Defense, he was able to review these plans immediately.
He made two significant changes on the southern front. The first concerned strategy. Originally it was envisioned to send two divisions into combat against the Egyptians, keeping the third in reserve. Dayan-convinced by his own experience of 1956 that after the breakthrough, the Egyptians would be unable, practically and psychologically, to mount a counter-attack-decided to send in the third division with the first wave. This shortened the campaign and, perhaps, enabled the army to reach the Canal before the U.N. could react. The second decision was tactical. It had been proposed to land paratroopers by helicopters near Um Katef, a decisive location. This plan had been overruled by the General Staff as potentially too costly in lives. Dayan reinstated the original plan and was proved right.
On the other hand, Dayan was an inhibiting force on