of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Owing to the domestic

pressures exerted in the United States by the powerful Jewish and Fundamentalist Christian lobbies, which have a lot of influence in George W. Bush's White House, the ability of the American

administration to work for a solution is very limited. In spite of this, a "Quartet" consisting of the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the UN succeeded in presenting a so-called "Roadmap to Peace."

83. The Roadmap of 2003 is afflicted with the same basic fault as the Oslo Declaration of Principles of 1993. Although, unlike Oslo, it does define an aim ("Two states for two peoples"), it does not spell out where the borders of the future Palestinian state are going to be, thus emptying the "map" of its principal meaning. Ariel Sharon was able to accept the Roadmap (with 14

reservations that emptied it of its main content) since he was quite ready to confer the designation of "Palestinian state" on the Palestinian enclaves that he wants to set up in 10 percent of the country.

84. The Oslo experience, and of course the new experiment of the Roadmap, confirm conclusively that a document that sets out interim stages is valueless unless it clearly spells out from the outset the details of the final peace agreement. In the absence of such a definition, there is no possibility at all that the interim stages will be realized. When each side is striving for a different final aim, the confrontation is bound to flare up again at every interim stage.

85. Well knowing that there is no chance at all for the actual realization of the Roadmap, Sharon announced at the end of 2003 his plan for "unilateral steps." This is a code-name for the annexation of about half of the West Bank to Israel and the confining of the Palestinians in isolated enclaves, connected only by roads, tunnels, and bridges that can be cut off at any time. The plan is constructed in such a way that none of the Palestinian population will be added to Israel, and no land reserves remain for the Palestinian enclaves. Since the plan does not require any negotiation with the Palestinians, but claims to bring "peace and security" to the Israeli citizens, it is able to exploit the growing Israeli longing for a solution without disturbing any Israeli's prejudices and hatred against the Palestinians.

86. The general attack of the Sharon government and the army leadership on the population in the occupied territories (extension of the settlements, establishment of new settlements called

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