Zionists, I told him. They never said "No." At every stage they agreed to accept what was offered to them, and immediately went on to strive for more. The Palestinians, on the contrary, always said "No" and lost.

Some time before the agreement was signed, I had an especially interesting meeting in Tunis. I did not yet know what was happening in Oslo, but ideas for a possible agreement were in the air. The meeting took place in Arafat's office, with Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, Yassir Abed-Rabbo, and two or three others.

It was a kind of brainstorming session. We covered all the subjects under discussion: a Palestinian state, borders, Jerusalem, the settlements, security, and so on. Ideas were bandied about and considered. I was asked: "What can Rabin offer?" I asked in return: "What can you accept?" In the end we reached a kind of consensus that came very close to the Oslo agreement that was signed a few weeks later.

I remember, for example, what was said about Jerusalem. Some of those present insisted that they should not agree to any postponement. I said: "If we postpone the solution to the end of the negotiations, will you be in a better or worse situation then than now? Surely you will then be better situated to achieve what you want?"

The Oslo Agreement (officially the Declaration of Principles) was based, from the Palestinian point of view, on this assumption. It was supposed to give the Palestinians a minimal state-like basis, which would evolve gradually until the sovereign State of Palestine would be established.

The trouble was that this final aim was not spelled out in the agreement. That was its fatal defect.

The long-term Palestinian aim was perfectly clear. It had been fixed by Arafat long before: the State of Palestine in all the occupied territories, a return to the borders existing before the 1967 war (with the possibility of minor swaps of territory here and there), East Jerusalem (including the Islamic and Christian shrines) as the capital of Palestine, dismantling of the settlements on Palestinian territory, a solution of the refugee problem in agreement with Israel. This aim has not been and will not be changed. Any Palestinian leader who accepted less would be branded by his people as a traitor.

But the Israeli aim was not fixed at all, and has remained open to this day. That is why the implementation of practically every part of the agreement has aroused such controversy, always resolved by the immense Israeli superiority of power. Gradually, the agreement gave up its soul, leaving behind only dead letters.

The main hope-that the dynamism of peace would dominate the process-was not realized.

Immediately after the signing of the agreement, we implored

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