with!") had captured the public, most of the peace camp had collapsed, hopelessness and impotence reigned supreme.
We wanted to light a candle in the darkness. To prove to the public that there is a solution, that there is somebody to talk to and something to talk about. And, most importantly, to tell the people what the price of peace is, and that it is worthwhile to pay it.
We saw ourselves as an icebreaker, a compact and autonomous vessel that opens the way for much bigger ships to follow.
We published the draft treaty as a full-page ad in Ha'aretz (August 10, 2001). It did not cause much of a stir. As usual all the Israeli media boycotted it, and even abroad it attracted only limited attention. But we hoped that we had opened a path, and that others would use it in due course.
The first who did so were Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon, the former the president of an Arab university and the scion of an important Jerusalem family, the latter a former commander of the Israeli navy and a former chief of the security service. They presented a small number of basic principles for a peace accord, launched a big publicity campaign and called for mass signatures on both sides. Up to now, some 65,000 Palestinians and 85,000 Israelis have signed.59
Now comes the initiative of a group of important Israeli and Palestinian personalities. Like our initiative at the time, it takes the form of a detailed draft peace agreement. In their content, too, the two documents are quite similar. It can be said that 90 percent of the proposals are the same. And no wonder-after endless plans, endless rounds of negotiations, and endless talks, all the problems lie on the table and everyone knows what the parameters of a possible compromise are.
Both drafts are based on the principle of "two states for two peoples," with their capitals in Jerusalem, a border based on the Green Line, removal of the settlers from the Palestinian territories, and a practical solution of the refugee problem.
The differences are mainly due to Beilin-Abed-Rabbo's desire to sweeten the pill for the Israelis as much as possible. For example, we proposed to cure the historical wound through Israel's acceptance of its responsibility for the creation of at least part of the refugee problem and its recognition of the principle of the right of return. We believe that such a declaration is necessary for the cleaning of the wound.
The new initiative deliberately ignores the painful question of principle and deals only with the practical solution. Beilin says that the Palestinians have "given up" the right of return de jure, too-a statement the Palestinians will it find difficult to swallow.