now by news reports of a thousand tanks massing along the frontier, the closing of the Straits, and the retreat of the U.N. forces, this propaganda was taken as a statement of intent, the declaration of actual Arab policy about to be set in motion.

The propaganda buildup seems to have been intended to impress the Israelis with the great superiority and confidence of the Arab army, in order to deter Israel from attack and leave Nasser in possession of a bloodless victory. The result was, again, the exact opposite. By now the Israelis knew they had to make war, and the great massed army in the barren wastes of the Negev waited with growing impatience and irritability for the order. One cannot keep a citizens' army wating for long without grave psychological and economic risks. Time, which was long for the Arabs, was very short for the Israelis. The decision could not be postponed much longer.

* * *

Yet on May 28, when the Israeli Government-by now in continuous session-was faced with the decision, it hesitated. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who had just returned after trying to convince the Americans, the British and the French to run the blockade and force the issue, urged restraint. But restraint was unpopular. Nobody in Israel believes that foreigners will help us to survive. It is a deep Jewish belief, the outcome of many generations of persecutions and most especially of the experiences during the Nazi time, that no gentile would lift a finger to save Jewish lives. Unconsciously held by almost everyone in Israel, this attitude has a profound influence on public opinion and helps to explain still another paradox of the Middle East crisis. Nasser believed that Israel was an American puppet, and he hoped that by some deal with America he could keep the Israelis inactive. The Israelis, for their part, would not dream of putting their trust in America, or anyone else, in a crisis where their survival seemed at

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