could not hold onto Palestine without great cost, and this did not seem worthwhile when a new British imperial strategic doctrine made Palestine seem unimportant.
When British withdrawal from Palestine in the midForties became probable, the Arab problem suddenly-and for the first time-loomed large on the Zionist horizon. Ben-Gurion was one of the first to realize it. Precisely at that time, another milestone in his career was reached, again by the accident of death. After the murder of Arlozoroff, Ben-Gurion became Zionist Prime Minister. Now with the death by natural causes of Eliahu Golomb, the modest and patient founder and guiding spirit of the Haganah, Ben-Gurion assumed, in addition, the portfolio of Defense. Thus, just when a large-scale war with the Arabs had become inevitable, Ben-Gurion took on the job of preparing for it. The man who had struggled against the Arabs for decades in the orange groves of PetachTiqvah and the fields of Sejjera was now in charge of the Ministry of War.
The test of force imminent, military affairs became the focus of Israeli life. Ben-Gurion, who had never had any connection with military activity (except his short service in the British Army in World War I), overnight became the "compleat" military figure, the man in battledress, and stayed this way until the end of his office in 1963. To the new generation he became thoroughly identified as a military man. This was a far cry from the trade union leader of early days. Imagine John L. Lewis as field commander of the U.S. Army.
Both Ben-Gurion and Zionism had come a long way.
* * *
In early January, 1948, there was a secret meeting at Ben-Gurion's little house on Keren Kajemeth Boulevard in Tel Aviv. Assembled was the high command of the Haganah and the Jewish Agency experts for Arab affairs. One after another, the experts discounted the idea that