successful commanders of the war resigned from the army after victory.
Another argument, more important in its consequences, concerned grand strategy. One of Ben-Gurion's deepest convictions was that on no account should Israel ever come into conflict with a Western power. This was in direct line with traditional Zionist policy, based on the conviction that in its fight with the Arabs, Israel must have the support of one Western power at least. Thus, Ben-Gurion dragged his feet on the Jordanian front, limiting his actions against the Jordanian Army, which was commanded by British officers. Although he did much to keep the way between the bulk of Israel and Jerusalem open (even ordering a brigade into a disastrous battle at Latrun, against the advice of the General Staff), he left the Jerusalem sector command to the worst general in the army, and did nothing to conquer the Old City. Many people (including the brilliant Israel Baer, who wrote a book in prison before he died there after being convicted as a Soviet spy) believe that Ben-Gurion did not want to antagonize the British protectors of Transjordan. Indeed, throughout the war, Ben-Gurion conducted negotiations with that wily desert chief, King Abdallah of Transjordan. One may assume that from a purely military point of view, Israel could have conquered the Jordanian West Bank even in 1948.
The disputes came to a head in early 1949, when some Israeli battalions, commanded by the best general of the war, Yigal Allon, crossed the Egyptian frontier and drove to the outskirts of El Arish. From there it could easily have cut off the whole Egyptian Army in the field, captured Gaza and dictated terms to King Farouk. But at that moment the United States delivered an ultimatum. Ambassador James McDonald went to see Ben-Gurion in Tiberias, where he was vacationing, and made it clear that the U.S. would not tolerate an Israeli invasion of Egyptian territory. Faced with this threat, Ben-Gurion