1954: A SPY STORY ioy
open mind, ready to move in any direction as the opportunity presented itself or as expediency dictated, meanwhile continuing the usual verbal attack on Israel. It seems a pity that no determined elfort was made at the time to see if a settlement with him could be made. But the Israeli leadership was so convinced that Arab nationalism is a threat to Israel, that the possibility of an entente with a young nationalist Arab leader must have seemed ridiculous.
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To the casual observer, the situation was still tranquil, even favorable, on June 23, 1953, when Israeli and Egyptian officers signed an agreement by which each side undertook to return safely any ship and crew of the other side that might inadvertently reach its shores. On the following September 3, a Greek ship, the S. S. Parnon, was detained in Port Said on its way from Haifa to Elat with a load of asphalt, but several days later it was released. Israelis considered this an important step, making shipping between Haifa and Elat possible through the Suez Canal. During the Jewish High Holy Days that year, General Nagib personally went to visit the synagogue in Cairo, conveying the best wishes of the Egyptian Government to Egyptian Jewry.
But these were superficial signs; under the surface things were moving, with mounting tension. On September 17, London announced a near-agreement with Egypt on evacuation of the Suez Canal. Three days later the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, Abba Eban, conveyed to Dulles the anxiety of the Israeli Government about American arms shipments to Egypt. (Dulles had visited both Israel and Egypt earlier in the year, giving Nagib a pearl-handled pistol as a personal gift from President Eisenhower. The U.S. Secretary of State hoped to persuade Egypt to become the cornerstone of a new Western-oriented military alliance of Middle Eastern countries, a buffer against Soviet