the other two fronts. When the Old City of Jerusalem was encircled, he was against a frontal attack on it. On the insistence of other Cabinet members, but against Dayan's wishes, this attack was mounted, thereby gaining all of Jerusalem before the cease-fire came into effect. On the Syrian front, Dayan delayed the attack for forty-eight hours, against the express wish of the Cabinet and the local commanders. Dayan wanted to concentrate a much larger force for this operation, the most difficult one of the war. This enabled new troops to rush from the Jordanian to the Syrian front. No one who saw it will ever forget the mad scramble of units, in commandeered taxis and trucks, in seemingly utter disorder, in a race against time, yet sorting itself out effortlessly at the moment of attack. It was the Israeli Army at its unique best. However, if the Baathist government sits today in Damascus, it can thank Dayan. Without his intervention, Damascus would certainly have been captured before the cease-fire became effective.

On the grand decision to start the war, Dayan had little influence, and no influence was needed. His being co-opted in the government was already a part of the resolve to put an end to the crisis by attacking the Egyptians, a decision with which the whole country agreed, and which, by that time, had become inevitable. But his presence certainly stiffened this resolve, dispelling the last doubts.

* * *

Where is Dayan going now? The Ministry of Defense is a focal point in Israeli politics, embodying as it does, a great concentration of power. But its Minister is not necessarily the crown prince of Israeli politics. Whether Dayan will attain his obvious objective, the Prime Ministry, depends very much upon the turn of events and the changing mood of the country. A public opinion poll immediately after the war, showed, significantly, that while more than eighty per cent of the people approved of

145