after his assassination, Yitzhak Rabin continued furthering expansion "on the ground," while simultaneously engaging in the political process for the achievement of peace according to Israeli perceptions. As a disciple of the Zionist "narrative" and its mythology, he suffered from cognitive dissonance when his sincere desire for peace clashed with his conceptual world. This became apparent when he refrained from removing the Jewish settlement in Hebron after the Goldstein massacre of praying Muslims. It appears that he began to internalize some parts of the Palestinian narrative only towards the end of his life.
68. The case of Shimon Peres is much more damning. He created for himself the international image of a peacemaker and even
adjusted his language to reflect this image ("the New Middle East") while remaining essentially a traditional Zionist hawk.
This became clear in his short and bloody period as Prime
Minister after the assassination of Rabin in 1995 and, again, in his joining the Sharon government in 2001 and accepting the role of spokesman and apologist for Sharon.
69. The clearest expression of the Israeli dilemma was provided by Ehud Barak, who came to power thoroughly convinced of his
ability to cut the Gordian knot of the historical conflict in one dramatic stroke, in the fashion of Alexander the Great. Barak approached the issue in total ignorance of the Palestinian
narrative, showing utter contempt for its significance. He drew up his proposals in complete disregard of the Palestinian side and presented them as an ultimatum. He was shocked and enraged
when the Palestinians rejected them.
70. In his own eyes and in the eyes of the entire Israeli public, Barak "turned every stone" and made the Palestinians "more generous offers than any previous Prime Minister." In exchange, he
demanded that the Palestinians sign a declaration that these offers constitute the "end to the conflict." The Palestinians considered this absurd, since Barak was asking them to give up their basic national aspirations, such as the right of return and sovereignty over East Jerusalem, including the Temple Mount. Moreover, the annexation of territories that were presented by Barak as
negligible percentages (such as the "Settlement Blocs") amounted, according to Palestinian calculations, to an actual annexation of 20 percent of the West Bank to Israel.
71. In the Palestinian view, they had already made their decisive concession by agreeing to establish their state beyond the Green Line, in a mere 22 percent of their historical homeland. Therefore,