In general, it follows the policy of Yassir Arafat: the two-state solution, a Palestinian state in all the territory occupied in 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, the release of all Palestinian prisoners. This means, of course, the recognition of Israel in practice.
For the Israeli public, the most problematical part concerns, as usual, the refugee problem. No Palestinian leader can give up the right of return, and this document, too, raises this demand. But in practice, the Palestinians acknowledge the fact that this problem can be solved only in agreement with Israel. That means that return to Israel must necessarily be limited in numbers, and the greater part of the solution lies in a return to the Palestinian state and payment of compensation. There is a difference between the recognition of the right of return in principle, as a basic human right, and the exercise of this right in the real world.
An important part of the document concerns putting the Palestinian house in order. The body that is supposed to represent the whole Palestinian people, inside and outside the country, is the PLO. That is also the body that has signed all the agreements with Israel. But the PLO is now far from reflecting the domestic Palestinian political reality. Hamas, which came into being at the beginning of the First Intifada, is not represented at all. The same goes for Islamic Jihad. The document demands that both be represented in the PLO-a reasonable and wise demand. It also calls for new elections to the all-Palestinian parliament-the Palestinian National Council-and for a National Unity Government.67
The prison agreement can help Hamas to cope with the new reality, and that is probably one of the main motives of its authors.
The sweeping victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections was a surprise not only for Israel and the world, but also for Hamas itself. The movement was completely unprepared to assume the responsibilities of power. The new situation creates a severe contradiction between the ideology of Hamas and the requirements of a governing party. As Ariel Sharon said: "What you see from here you don't see from there."
This contradiction finds its expression in the declarations of different leaders of Hamas. This is not duplicity, but rather an expression of different reactions to a new reality. The point of view of Khaled Mashaal in Damascus is necessarily quite different from the point of view of Ismail Haniyeh, the new Prime Minister in Gaza. Political and military leaders also often see things differently.
That is a natural confusion, and probably more time will pass before a consensus is achieved and a joint position defined. No wonder,