Make preparations calmly? No! We cannot allow them to prepare calmly. We have to harass them, to threaten them on all sides, not allow them a moment’s peace. At brigade HQ, nearRehovot, thisworkgoes on at a feverish pace. The commander and his operations chief are hunched over plans for new operations. Battalion commanders come in and out. The telephone and the radio are never quiet.

Night after night the boys go out and attack. The attacks are small. They are more like harassment - a blow here, a blow there. But the enemy gets nervous and uses up huge quantities of ammunition. All his weapons fire away as soon as the slightest rustling is heard. No, the Egyptians will be given no chance to make their preparations calmly.

* * *

4 June 1948. Units from all parts of the southern region assemble at Gan-Yavne and Bitzaron. Tonight they will launch a large-scale attack on the Egyptian army near Isdud.

The commander gets no sleep this night. He knows the risks of the step he is attempting. To allow the necessary concentration of forces he has to leave large areas with inadequate defense. He knows that the Egyptians have three to five heavy machine guns for every light automatic weapon he has. He also knows that the available communication system is insuf-ficientfor the five battalions that he is committing to the battle. There will be almost no connection between the units, and as soon as the battle begins there will be no possibility of coordination.

But he knows another thing: there is no alternative. We have to attack, precisely because we don’t have enough forces. This goes against all the rules of the theory of war. And yet it is correct: when you don’t have enough forces to defend yourself against an attack, then you have to go on the offensive yourself. Hit him, harass him, deceive him. Make it impossible for him to prepare his forces for an orderly attack. This rule has a high price. But it offers the only possibility of saving the south and the city of Tel Aviv.

Slowly the first reports are coming in. The operation has failed. All our attacks have been repelled. Our losses are high, very high. But still: the enemy is impressed by the strength of our attacks. He will think twice before moving out of his positions.

* * *

Now begins the mental, the intellectual struggle between the two com-manders. It concerns the coastal plane to the south of Tel Aviv. At the

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