for a pincer movement. If this is successful the whole Israeli front would collapse and the wide plain would be open all the way to Tel Aviv.
The failure of the attack on Beit Daras and the Israeli attack in the region ofNegba have messed up this plan. But the Egyptians rely on their large quantities of arms. If the first blow fails, they follow up with a second, a third. And if that, too, is insufficient, then they will attack four, five, or ten times. They have enough reserves.
The fighting around Ibdis and Negba raged for four days and four nights. A battle that cannot be compared with any other in this war. On the second day it reached its hellish high point. To divert the Israeli forces, the Egyptians attack the village of Julis, which controls the western part of the front. With the help of this diversionary tactic, the decisive attack on Ibdis is carried out.
An attack? No. Eight attacks on a single day, one after the other. Artillery, mortars, and aircraft turn the position into hell. And then come the tanks and behind them the infantry assault. They come once, three times, five times, eight times.
Since the morning a continuous stream of wounded flows out of the position. The company commander is among them. To replace him, another company commander is sent over. Between the explosions of the shells and bombs, the radio reports: the squad leaders and the ordinary soldiers wish to report that they are managing. They can be relied on. Toward the evening the company that defended Ibdis during the day is reduced to a few squads. A replacement company is sent. The same fate awaits them. But the soldiers take over the position without grumbling.
* * *
The battle HQ is located a few kilometers behind the front. It is the con-trol center for the whole front. Here decisions that are made in seconds affect the fate of the state. On the radio here the heartbeat of the bleed-ing front can be heard. And like in a power station, the power is pro-duced here to drive the units.
At ten o’clock in the morning there is a meeting of battalion com-manders and their deputies. They are simple young men who bend over the map. One is a farmer, another a philosophy student. But they are in command of men in this hell. They see the personal example of Shimon Avidan and "Me’irke," his deputy. They discuss the plans for the next twenty-four hours and make the necessary decisions.
They return to their units, visit the places where their troops will be in